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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Safeco's brief acknowledges that this Court must review the trial court's grant of
summary judgment de novo, and that all reasonable inferences from the facts must be
viewed in favor of Appellants. Despite these well accepted standards, Safeco repeatedly
relies upon disputed facts and inferences drawn in its favor in order to portray this case in
a light favorable to it. For example, Safeco characterizes the case as simply involving
"Stone Flood's claim that Safeco's making an insurance payment in February 2001
instead of January 2001 caused the failure of Stone Flood's entire business at all 3 of its
locations 4 years later." (Appellee's Brief at 4). This statement is a vast understatement
of Appellants' claims in this case. {See, e.g. Appellants' Brief, pp. 8-11).
Contrary to Safeco's Statement of Facts, there are significant disputes of fact
regarding the applicability of the tolling statute to Stone Flood's claims and the Stones'
individual standing to pursue tort claims against Safeco, warranting reversal of the trial
court's summary judgment in Safeco's favor.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CALCULATED THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON STONE FLOOD'S CLAIMS, OR
AN ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS IN THAT REGARD.

'wAs with any affirmative defense, [Safeco] ha[sj the burden of proving every
element necessary to establish that the statute of limitations bars [Stone Flood's] claim."
Seale v. Gowans, 923 P. 2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996). As explained below, Safeco has
failed to meet this burden and the trial court should accordingly be reversed.

1

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21~313(1) provides, uAn action on a written policy or
contract of first party insurance must be commenced within three years after the inception
of the loss." Stone Flood's claims were timely filed under this subsection for two
reasons. Foremost, in the context of a first party bad faith claim, the 'inception of the
loss" under Section 31A-21-313(1) did not occur until Safeco put Stone Flood on notice
that it would not to honor its duties under the policy. Second, the three-year limitations
period in Section 31A-21-313(1) was tolled during several discrete time periods,
including the initial 60 days after the fire, the period of time in which the claim was being
appraised, and the time period set forth in the parties' tolling agreement, which separately
or collectively render Stone Flood's current suit timely filed. For those reasons, the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Safeco should be reversed.
A.

As applied to a first party bad faith claim, the "inception of the
loss" under Section 31A-21-313(1) occurs when the insured
knows or should know that the insurer will not honor its
obligations under the policy.

The three-year statute of limitation in Section 31 A-21-313(1) is triggered upon the
'inception of the loss."

In the first party bad faith context, the only reasonable

interpretation of the phrase "inception of the loss" is the moment the insurer breaches its
obligations of good faith under the policy. Construing the 'inception of the loss" to mean
the date of the occurrence of the underlying event that triggers coverage under the policy,
rather the date on which the insurer acts in bad faith by refusing to honor its duty to pay,
results in the illogical and inequitable result that insurance companies are free to breach
their duties of good faith and fair dealing to their own insureds at any point more than

2

three years subsequent to an occurrence giving rise to coverage. In other words, even
where an insured's bad faith claim against his own insurer has not even accrued yet, the
claim could nonetheless be barred under Section 31A-21-313(1). Because Section 31A21-313(1) is not a statute of repose, that is not the outcome that should result from
application of this limitation period. See Section LB.3., supra.
Despite this seemingly self-evident conclusion, Safeco claims that it is ^difficult to
imagine a case in which an insurer's failure to compensate for an insured loss does not
give rise to a cause of action until more than 3 years after the insured loss[.]" (Appellee's
Brief at 19). Yet, Safeco does not contend (and has not offered any evidence to show)
that all first party insurance claims are resolved within three years. Although it may be
somewhat uncommon for a claim to take longer than three years to resolve, the frequency
of such an occurrence is not a basis for interpreting a statute.
Many insurance claims (especially those involving catastrophic losses), can take
more than three years to adjust. For example, an investigation into the cause of a fire loss
can take years, especially if the fire is alleged to have resulted from a defect in a
complicated product or appliance located in a burnt building. Likewise, if the insured
and insurer are engaged in mediation or settlement negotiations regarding a claim for
coverage under the policy, those negotiations can extend resolution of a claim more than
three years after an underlying event implicating coverage, particularly if the negotiation
process commences after a lengthy investigation. Furthermore, if the insurer and insured
dispute whether coverage is owed for a loss, they may litigate a declaratory judgment
proceeding on the sole issue of coverage, which might take longer than three years. In a

3

claim on a policy of life insurance, the issue of the cause of the decedent's death might be
disputed, and the investigation into the cause of death might take longer than three years.
If the insured is a minor at the time of the underlying event implicating coverage, he
might be younger than 15 years old, and may not have diligent guardians to pursue his
first party bad faith causes of action. If the insured becomes incapacitated, perhaps even
in the underlying event triggering coverage, the insured might require the appointment of
a guardian and conservator, which may be contested. In a claim involving coverage
benefits to be paid ongoing over a period of time after a certain underlying event
triggering such coverage, such as credit insurance, the coverage may be owed over a
lengthy period longer than three years after the event giving rise to coverage. In a claim
under a policy of homeowners insurance on a vacation property, the insured may not
discover a loss until weeks or months after an underlying event giving rise to coverage.
The list goes on. Simply put, there are many different situations in which an insurance
claim might take more than three years to be resolved.l
This Court's interpretation of the meaning of the three-year statute of limitations
in Section 31A-21-313(1) will apply to all claims arising under a written policy of
insurance, involving foreseen and unforeseen factual scenarios and many different kinds
of insurance. Under Safeco's urged interpretation, if the resolution of the claim, for

1

Even with a more straightforward claim, such as Stone Flood's claim here, where there
was immediate discovery of the event implicating coverage, no minor plaintiff, no
lengthy mediation or settlement negotiations, and no declaratory judgment action on
coverage, Safeco says it still needed approximately 10 months to determine its position
on the amount it owed to Stone Flood. (See Appellee's Brief at 6)(R. 120)

4

whatever reason, takes longer than three years after the underlying event implicating
coverage, the insurer is free to commit bad faith with impunity. The insured is then left
without a remedy because the statute of limitations in Section 31A-21-313(1) will have
expired before his or her first party bad faith claim arose at all. This is not a reasonable
interpretation of Section 31A-21-313(1).

Consequently, the "inception of the loss"

language in Section 31A-21-313(1) must mean when the insurer first commits a breach of
the duty of good faith.
To argue that even in first party bad faith cases the inception of the loss occurs at
the same time as the underlying event implicating coverage, Safeco cites at length to the
1996 legislative session amendments to Section 31A-21-313. (Appellee's Brief at 1620). Although Safeco spends four and a half pages (Appellee's Brief at 16-20) setting up
this straw man argument, Stone Flood is not disputing that this is a first party bad faith
claim and that Section 31A-21-313 does not apply to third party claims, which are not
even at issue in this case. Stone Flood has never argued to the contrary.
Safeco also cites to a string of cases from other jurisdictions purporting to hold
that, in a case involving a fire, the "inception of the loss" always means the date of the
Safeco oddly asserts that the term of art "bad faith" is restricted to third party tort claims
under Utah law. Nevertheless, since 1985 when this Court decided Beck v. Farmers Ins.
Exchange, the term "bad faith" has been utilized to describe not only third party claims,
but also first party insureds' claims against insurers for breach of the contractual implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 701 P. 2d 795, 798-801 (Utah 1985);
Christiansen v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 2005 UT 21, ^f 9, 116 P.3d 259
(characterizing claim as "first-party bad faith claim"); Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 68, U 31, 56 P. 3d 524 (same); Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 840
P. 2d 130, 140 (Utah App. 1992)(Characterizing "first-party cases" involving "an
insurer's belated payment of a claim after intentionally refusing to pay it" as claim for
"bad faith").
5

fire. (Appellee's Brief at 20, n. 12). However, those are inapposite because they do not
address first party bad faith claims for general and consequential damages, and instead
deal only with claims for coverage owed under the policy, a materially distinct claim.
Safeco is also incorrect in claiming that there is "tension" between Section 78B-2102 and Stone Flood's urged interpretation of Section 31A-21-313(1). Section 78B-2102 provides, "Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods prescribed in
this chapter, after the cause of action has accrued, except in specific cases where a
different limitation is prescribed by statute." Safeco appears to argue that, under Section
78B-2-102, no statute of limitations codified outside of Title 78B, Chapter 2 is subject to
the requirement of accrual of a cause of action. (See Appellee's Brief at 22)("Where a
different limitation period is prescribed [outside Title 78B], the limitation period does not
begin when "the cause of action has accrued"). Thus, Safeco says, if the Court holds that
the "inception of the loss" triggering the three-year statute of limitation in Section 31A21-313(1) occurs on the date the first party bad faith claim accrues, rather than on the
date of the underlying event implicating coverage, Section 78B-2-102 will have "no
meaningful role to play in the Utah Code." Id.
In actuality, Stone Flood's urged construction harmonizes Section 78B-2-102 and
Section 31A-21-313(1). Section 78B-2-102 recognizes that "after [a] cause of action has
accrued," it is subject to one of the limitation periods in Title 78B, Chapter 2, "except in
specific cases where a different period is proscribed by statute." The language "except in
specific cases where a different period is proscribed by statute" does not, as Safeco
suggests, mean that all limitation periods provided outside of Title 78B are statutes of
6

repose excepted from the requirement of accrual of the cause of action. Rather, it merely
means that after a cause of action accrues, it is subject to one of the limitation periods
prescribed in Title 78B, Chapter 2, unless a different limitation applies. There is no
"tension" between that fact and Stone Flood's interpretation of Section 31A-21-313(1).
Safeco also unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish this Court's opinion in Tucker
v. State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 54, 53 P. 3d 947. In Tucker, this Court
construed the "inception of the loss" language in Section 31A-21-313(1) as applied to a
first party claim for PIP benefits. Significantly, this Court stated that the "inception of
the loss" was a date other than the date on which the auto accident implicating coverage
occurred, i.e. something other than the date analogous to the date of the fire in this case.
Id. at % 16 ("...it is clear that in November 1996 the Tuckers were on notice that State
Farm did not intend to fully reimburse the Tuckers' medical expenses. Thus, November
1996 was the 'inception of the loss' triggering the beginning of the limitations
/?enW.)(Emphasis added). If anything, Tucker is more consistent with Stone Flood's
interpretation of Section 31A-21-313(1) than Safeco's because this Court concluded in
Tucker that the inception of the loss date was something other than the date on which the
underlying event implicating coverage occured, i.e. something other than the date of the
motor vehicle accident or the date of a fire loss of insured property. Id.
This Court should hold that under Section 31A-21-313(1), the "inception of the
loss" commencing the countdown of the three-year statute of limitation occurred on the
date Stone Flood knew or should have known Safeco would not honor its obligations
under the policy, rather than the date of the fire. Safeco did not establish as a matter of
7

law that the breach occurred within 3 days of the fire. According, this Court should
reverse the trial court.
B.

The 60-day waiting period on filing suit set forth in Section 31A21-313(4) tolled the limitation period in subsection (1) by
operation of law.
A

There is no conflict between Section 78B-2-112 and Section
31A-21-313(5).

In its opening brief, Stone Flood argued that the three-year statute of limitations in
31A-21-313(1) was tolled during the sixty days after the fire, pursuant to two statutory
provisions: Section 31A-21-313(4) and Section 78B-2-112.

Section 31A-21-313(4)

imposes a sixty day delay on filing suit against an insurer and provides, in relevant part,
"no action may be brought against an insurer on an insurance policy to compel payment
under the policy until the earlier of: (a) sixty days after proof of loss has been furnished
as required under the policy[.]" Section 78B-2-112 excludes delays on filing an action
from the statute of limitation period and provides, "The duration of an injunction or
statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an action may not be counted as part of
the statute of limitations."
In opposition, Safeco argues that the 60-day delay on filing suit set forth in
Section 31A-21-313(4) only applies to claims to compel coverage benefits under the
policy, but does not apply to independent claims for damages arising from bad faith.
(Appellee's Brief at 26). However, in its prior argument regarding the meaning of the
"inception of the loss" language in Section 31A-21-313(1), Safeco asserts there is no
distinction between claims for coverage under the policy and claims for independent

8

damages arising from bad faith, because Safeco says the "inception of the loss" for both
types of claims is the same, i.e. the date of the underlying event implicating coverage.
Safeco cannot have it both ways.

Either Section 31A-21-313 distinguishes

between claims for coverage under the policy and claims for independent harms arising
from the insurer's bad faith refusal to pay or it does not. If Safeco's position is indeed
that Section 31A-21-313 distinguishes between first party claims for coverage and first
party claims for bad faith damages, such that there inherently must be different dates of
inception of the loss for both claims, then Stone Flood is in agreement that the 60-day bar
does not apply to its bad faith claims against Safeco.
Safeco next argues the effect of Section 31A-21-313(2), which states, "Except as
provided in Subsection (1) or elsewhere in this title, the law applicable to limitation of
actions in Title 78B, Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations, applies to actions on insurance
policies." Safeco asserts that, under subsection (2), the 60-day delay on filing suit
contained in subsection (4) did not toll the applicable three-year statute of limitations in
subsection (1) because, according to Safeco, the tolling provision for appraisal or
arbitration in Section subsection (5) constitutes the sole and exclusive instance in which a
claim arising under a policy of insurance can be tolled. Based upon that assumption,
Safeco contends that Section 31A-21-313(5) precludes tolling of a claim arising under a
policy of insurance under any other provision of law, such as the tolling provision in

9

Section 78B-2-112, which prohibits statutory delay periods from counting toward a
statute of limitation/
This argument defies logic, because there is no conflict between tolling an
insurance claim during multiple periods, including when the parties conduct an appraisal
or arbitration, and again during periods of statutory delays on filing suit, and again during
periods of minority or incapacity, etc. The fact that the Legislature expressed one tolling
provision in one location, and another tolling provision in another, does not render them
in conflict

Section 78B-2-112 should be interpreted to toll Section 31A-21-313(1)

during the 60-day delay period set forth in Section 31A-21-313(4).
Safeco admits that under its restrictive interpretation of 31A-21-313(2) & (5),
every single tolling provision codified outside of the Insurance Code is rendered
inapplicable to claims arising under written contracts of insurance. (Appellee Br. at 29.)
Thus, according to Safeco, not only is Section 78B-2-112 (excluding mandatory delays
from the limitation period) inapplicable, but so is Section 78B-2-108 (minors and
incapacitated persons), and Section 75-3-108 (one year extension for claims by
decedents' estates), etc.
Contrary to Safeco's argument, it is not "difficult to imagine" the equitable
concerns that arise from doing away with tolling of claims for minors, incompetent

J

"The duration of an injunction or statutory prohibition which delays the filing of an
action may not be counted as part of the statute of limitations."

10

persons, and decedents under written policies of insurance.

Although minors can

disavow contracts, they are not required to under the law, and no law prohibits a minor
from being named as an insured or beneficiary in a policy of insurance. Moreover, as
pointed out above, there are numerous instances in which an insured might be rendered
incapacitated for longer than three years, including an injury sustained in the underlying
event triggering coverage.
In short, although Section 31A-21-313(5) contains a tolling provision for periods
of appraisal or arbitration, that provision i n no way conflicts with the other tolling
provisions in the Utah Code, such as Section 78B-2-112 argued by Stone Flood here.
Because there is no conflict, there is no logical basis to conclude that Section 31A-21313(5) sets forth the only instance in which an insurance claim may be tolled.

Safeco's

argument that Section 31A-21-313(5) precludes tolling under any other tolling provision
in the Utah Code is unreasonable and should be rejected.
2.

Safeco cannot utilize Stone Flood's arguendo arguments as
admissions of fact.

In its opening brief, Stone Flood assumed for the sake of its argument on this issue
that Safeco wrongfully denied foil payment to Stone Flood on the date of the fire for
benefits owed under the policy. (Appellants' Brief at p. 24, n. 10). Safeco claims this
"concession," which was made arguendo, precludes Stone Flood from also arguing that
Indeed, this Court has expressed policy concerns regarding endangering minors' claims
by taking away the protection of the minor's tolling statute. See Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P. 2d
572, 589 (Utah 1993)(striking down as unconstitutional Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act
provision rendering minor's tolling provision inapplicable to medical malpractice claims
of a minor, recognizing that "the law must guard the rights of children[.]")

11

the three-year statute of limitations in Section 31A-21-313(1) did not begin running until
60 days after the fire. This is because, according to Safeco, under Section 3 IA-21-313(4)
an insured is relieved of the 60-day delay on filing if the insurer denies full payment.
However, because the trial court found Stone Flood missed the statute by a mere
three days, it is significant that Stone Flood submitted record evidence and argued to the
trial court that Mrs. Stone's actual statement on November 17 was that there was an
"immediate need for cash to help make payroll that was due in three days and to meet
other overhead expenses . . .." {See R. 269)(emphasis added).) At the very least there is
a dispute of fact regarding exactly when Safeco denied payment, whether it was
November 17, 2000, the date of the fire, or three days later on November 20, 2000.
Assuming the jury finds that Safeco denied payment on November 20, 2000, such that the
statute of limitations in Section 31A-21-313(1) was in fact tolled for an additional three
days, Stone Flood's claims would be timely filed. This dispute of fact precludes
summary judgment, and Safeco has not met its burden of showing otherwise.
3.

The limitation period in Section 31A-21~313(]) is not a
statute of repose.

Safeco next maintains that the limitation period in Section 31A-21-313(1) should
be interpreted as a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations. Safeco did not
raise this argument in the proceedings below (R. 109-111; 115-231; 731-811; 1020;
1021), and accordingly it is precluded before this Court.

In any event, Safeco is

incorrect, because Section 31A-21-313(1) is not worded as a statute of repose.

12

In Berry By and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 111 P. 2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985),
this Court explained that %i[a] statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to be filed within a
specified period of time after a legal right has been violated or the remedy for the wrong
committed is deemed waived. A statute of repose bars all actions after a specified period
of time has run from the occurrence of some event other than the occurrence of an injury
that gives rise to a cause of action." Id. (Emphasis added).
At issue in Berry was the constitutionality of a statute of repose which provided:
No action shall be brought for the recovery of damages for personal injury,
death or damage to property more than six years after the date of initial
purchase for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture
of a product, where that action is based upon...
See also Norton v. Goldminerfs Daughter, 785 P. 2d 1087, 1088-89 (Utah 1989)(statute
of repose provided in relevant part, as of the date of that opinion, "No action to recover
damages ... shall be brought ... more than seven years after the completion of
construction.")(Emphasis added)(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5(1989)).
The statute at issue here, Section 31A-21-313(1), is not phrased at all like the
statutes of repose at issue in Berry and Norton. Section 31A-21-313(1) does not say u no
action shall be brought after..." or "no action shall be brought more than..." Rather, it
provides that claims shall be filed "within three years[.]" As such, it is evident from its
language that Section 31 A-21-313(1) is not a statute of repose.
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4.

If Section 31A-21-313(I) is a statute of repose, it violates the
Open Courts Clause of Art. I § 11 of the Utah Constitution.

If Section 31 A-21-313(1) is indeed a statute of repose, it is unconstitutional under
the Open Courts Clause of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.5 In Berry, this
Court held that the product liability statute of limitations was unconstitutional under the
Open Courts provision of Article I, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution.6 That Section
provides an individual with the right to a "remedy by due course of law" for injury to
"person, property, or reputation." Berry established that a statute of repose satisfies
constitutional muster under the Open Courts Clause only if it 1) "provides an injured
person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy ; by due course of law' and 2), ; if
there is no substitute or alternative remedy" there must a "clear social or economic evil to
be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or
unreasonable means for achieving the objective." Id. at 680.
In this case, if Safeco's interpretation of Section 31A-21-313(1) is adopted, it will
apply to all claims arising under a written policy of insurance and subject to that
limitation period.

Under that reading of the statute, there is no substantially equal

5

Safeco says Stone Flood failed to preserve an argument that Section 31A-21-313(1)
violates the Open Courts Clause. (Appellee's Brief at 20, n. 11.) But Safeco never
argued before the district court that Section 31 A-21-313(1) functions as a statute of
repose rather than a statute of limitations. (R. 109-111; 115-231; 731-811; 1020; 1021.)
Because Safeco never argued as much, Appellants never raised any prior Open Courts
challenge to Section 31 A-21-313(1).
6

Utah Const., Art. I, § 11 provides: All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course
of law, which shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person
shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by himself
or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party.
14

alternative remedy for vindication of Stone Flood's constitutional interest in a remedy for
its bad faith cause of action. Rather, Stone Flood is left without any remedy. Moreover,
there is no clear social or economic evil that is eliminated by abrogation of insureds' first
party bad faith claims that arise more than three years after the date of an occurrence of
an event implicating coverage. Finally, even had the legislature or Safeco identified
some social or economic evil targeted by the abrogation of the remedy, for example,
heightened insurance premiums, elimination of that remedy is still arbitrary and
unreasonable means of achieving the objective. As such, Section 31A-21-313(1) violates
the Open Courts Clause if it is a statute of repose.
C.
;

The period of tolling for the appraisal process commenced upon
Safeco's written demand of appraisal pursuant to the policy.

The period of limitation [in Section 31 A-21-313(1)] is tolled during the period in

which the parties conduct an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the
insurance policy, by law, or as agreed to by the parties." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21313(5). Stone Flood asserts that the appraisal procedure, and hence the tolling of the
three-year statute of limitations, commenced on February 3, 2003, the date Safeco itself
proclaims to have issued a "written demand" for an appraisal, and concluded on January
17, 2007, the date Safeco issued payment on the appraisers' decision.
Safeco counters that the parties could not have "conducted" an appraisal until they
selected their appraisers.

But that is an unduly narrow interpretation of the word

"conduct." Choosing appraisers and awaiting a court order were not required steps under
the policy in order to commence the appraisal process.
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Indeed, the "appraisal...

procedure prescribed by the insurance policy," § 31A-21-313(5), required only the
following to commence the appraisal process:
If we and you disagree on the amount of Net Income and operating
expenses or the amount of loss, either may make written demand for an
appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a competent and
impartial appraiser. The two appraisers will select an umpire. If they
cannot agree, either may request that selection be made by a judge of a
court having jurisdiction. The appraisers will state separately the amount of
Net Income and operating expense or amount of loss. If they fail to agree,
they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by
any two will be finding. Each party will:
a. Pay its chosen appraiser, and
b. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and umpire equally.
(R. 343.)
The Safeco policy states that the triggering event for the appraisal process is the
"written demand for an appraisal of the loss." No court order or appraiser selection is
required to activate the "appraisal procedure proscribed by the policy." Safeco issued its
written demand to Stone Flood on February 3, 2003 and the parties were ^conducting" an
appraisal after that date.
Significantly, in its memorandum in support of its motion to submit to
arbitration/appraisal and stay proceedings, Safeco itself characterized its February 3,
2003 letter as 'wa letter to Plaintiffs attorney making a written demand for an appraisal of

7

Safeco takes issue with the fact that Appellants did not select their appraiser until
January 2004 (Appellee's Brief at 7), but Safeco omits the fact that after the district court
ordered the appraisal on July 11, 2003, Safeco did not select its appraiser until November
21, 2003, barely two months before Stone Flood. (R. 121 ,\ 9; 169.)
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the loss." (R. 667.) As such, the trial court should have commenced the statutory tolling
for appraisals on that date.
D.

The appraisal period concluded when Safeco made payment in
compliance with the appraisers' order.

Although Safeco proclaims that Stone Flood did not preserve its argument that the
appraisal process ended on the date Safeco issued payment in compliance with the
appraisers' decision, Stone Flood clearly argued during the summary judgment
proceedings below that the appraisal process concluded on the date Safeco issued
payment. Specifically, Stone Flood contended that at the time the appraisers' issued their
decision on January 9, 2007, the appraisal "had not yet been concluded" because "there
were disagreements between the two appraisers." (R. 286, f 61.) In another location in
the summary judgment briefing, Stone Flood specifically asserted that "the appraisal was
not concluded as of January 9, 2007, because the two appraiser [sic] had disagreed on
some items, which the policy required the umpire to resolve.

... Additionally, the

appraisal process could not be complete until and unless Safeco paid benefits pursuant to
the appraisal which did not occur untilJanuary 23, 2007." (R. 299)(emphasis added)

Although Safeco did not make its February 3, 2003 letter part of the record, it has
submitted the letter to this Court anyway, justifying its actions with the rather transparent
excuse that "the purpose in attaching the letter is to inform the court as to what evidence
would be presented to the district court in the event of a remand to determine when the
tolling period began." (Appellee's Brief at 34, n. 22.) Given that Safeco itself
represented the February 3, 2003 letter to be "a letter to Plaintiffs attorney making a
written demand for an appraisal of the loss[,]" (R. 667) (emphasis added), it cannot not
now call such a characterization "inaccurate." (Appellee's Brief at 34, n. 22.) Safeco's
February 3 letter commenced the appraisal process as defined by the policy.
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Safeco finally argues that Stone Flood has not cited any ''authority" that the
appraisal process ended upon compliance with the appraisal award (i.e., payment). Even
so, Safeco has not shown any "authority" that the appraisal process ended on the date of
issuance of the appraisers' non-final, incomplete determination, and before payment.
Safeco has the burden of proving the applicability of the statute of limitation, Seale,
supra, at 1364, and has not done so.
E.

Stone Flood's claims fell within the parties' tolling agreement, or
a fact issue exists on that issue,

Safeco argues that Stone Flood's claims were not subject to the parties' June 2004
tolling agreement. In so arguing, Safeco fails to resolve factual disputes in Stone Flood's
favor, and refuses to recognize the existence of disputed material facts. For example,
Safeco repeatedly references the fact that the stipulation and order (R. 687-691) setting
forth a component of the parties' tolling agreement was not filed with the lower court,
and attempts to characterize that stipulation and order as the entire universe of the parties'
tolling agreement. But Stone Flood has never argued that the entirety of their agreement
was set forth in the stipulation and order. To the contrary, Stone Flood has consistently
maintained that the stipulation and order are only a portion of the parties' agreement, the
remainder of which was expressed in the correspondence that gave rise to the stipulation
and order. (R. 287-288; 676-677; 680; 687-691; 1020, p. 24.)
Safeco also boldly accuses Stone Flood of impliedly ''misleading" this Court
(Appellee Br. at 37) by stating that the trial court indicated the tolling agreement was
ambiguous. During the hearing on Safeco's motion for summary judgment, the trial
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court did indeed characterize the tolling agreement as "hopelessly ambiguous." (R. 1020,
p. 28.) Although the trial court made that observation within the discussion of the
Stones' individual claims, the observation is equally applicable to whether the parties'
tolling agreement encompassed Stone Flood's claims.
Safeco says that current counsel for Appellants was not counsel for Stone Flood
during the time of the Stone Flood I suit, and thus counsel could not have relied on the
tolling agreement in allowing Stone Flood I to be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Stone Flood submitted uncontested evidence (R. 408) that, "In accordance with the
tolling agreement, counsel permitted ...Stone Flood's lawsuit to be dismissed without
prejudice on September 16, 2005." (R. 288, f 67.) Absent putting both counsel on the
stand, the issue of reliance cannot be resolved as a matter of law, as Safeco urges.
In sum, the parties entered into a tolling agreement in which all claims of the
parties to both lawsuits, including Stone Flood, were to be expressly tolled pending the
appraisal process and until "discovery [was] completed." Correspondence consistently
mentioned that the agreement contemplated both of the pending lawsuits.

(See

Appellants' Brief at 30-34). At the very least, an issue of fact exists as to the scope of the
parties' tolling agreement, and summary judgment should not have been granted in
Safeco's favor.
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II.

JAMES AND PATRICE STONE HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT
THEIR PERSONAL CLAIMS.
A.

The Stones adequately briefed their argument that Safeco
exceeded its authority by conditioning payment on the Stones'
execution of personal guarantees.

In their opening brief, James and Patrice Stone argued that there is sufficient
evidence in the record to raise an issue of fact on whether Safeco effectively deemed the
Stones to be, or imposed obligations on the Stones as, insureds under the policy. Safeco
erroneously argues that the Stones did not adequately brief this argument. (Appellee's
Brief at 39.) In the opening brief, the Stones clearly cited to the record location of the
non-waiver agreement signed by the them, referenced the case law from the Utah Court
of Appeals holding that signatures are deemed to be in a person's individual capacity in
the absence of language evidencing a clear statement of corporate capacity, and made the
argument that Safeco treated the Stones as "de facto" insureds. (Appellants' Brief at 34.)
Notably absent from Safeco's brief is an explanation of any authority Safeco had
to require the Stones to guaranty repayment of coverage benefits payable to Stone Flood.
Safeco was not allowed to do so unless the Stones themselves were insureds under the
policy, and Safeco's own actions thus create an issue of fact on this issue.
Safeco does, however, reach the issue of the Stones' standing, if the Stones
individually are de facto insureds under the policy. Even if the Stones have standing,
Safeco says, their claims are still barred under the three-year limitation period in Section
31A-21-313(1). Safeco principally maintains that the Stones' individual claims were time
barred before the tolling agreement of June 2004, because, according to Safeco "the
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Stones did not participate in the appraisal, which means their claims were not tolled
during the appraisal process[.]" (Appellee's Brief at 40-41.)
If the Stones understand Safeco's argument correctly, Safeco never raised this
argument in its motion for summary judgment or anywhere else in the proceeds below.
(SeeR.

109-111; 115-231; 731-811; 1020; 1021.)

As such, it is not preserved for

purposes of appeal. In any event, the parties' own characterization of the stay during
appraisal as encompassing the claims of both sets of claimants has been addressed above.
Safeco next argues that even if the three-year limitation period on the Stones'
contract claims did not expire before the tolling agreement, the agreement did not toll the
Stones' claims between the date of dismissal of Stones I, February 16, 2006, and
September 17, 2007, when the Stones were added to Stone Flood II, the instant case.
Safeco says that the parties' tolling agreement was restricted to discovery in Stones I,
which it says ended at the conclusion of that case on February 16, 2006.
To make this argument, Safeco relies exclusively upon the stipulation and
proposed order. But as stated previously, the tolling agreement between the parties was
broader than what is reflected in the stipulation and order, and those documents were
only a part of the tolling agreement. As evidenced by the correspondence, the Stones
never agreed to toll their claims only until the dismissal of their first suit, Stones I.
Indeed, the Stones relied on their interpretation of the tolling agreement when they did
not re-file their claims against Safeco within one year of the February 16, 2006 dismissal.
(R. 288, U 67, 408.) At the very least there is a dispute of fact regarding whether the
tolling agreement encompassed the Stones' individual claims.
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B.

The Stones have adduced evidence of distinct and palpable harm
to them as individuals.

Regarding the Stones' claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
Safeco declares that the Stones are making a "novel" argument, but also that the
argument has been ^repeatedly rejected." Irrespective of Safeco's characterization of the
state of the law, the Stones have adduced evidence of a distinct and palpable injury to
them as individuals such that they have standing to assert IIED claims against Safeco.
Safeco recognizes that the law allows a shareholder of a corporation to sue for
individual harms, but Safeco claims that this exception does not apply in this case.
Safeco is overlooking the fact and reasonable inference that the Stones suffered
individual harm apart from the losses of the company. As a result of Safeco's bad faith,
the Stones were forced to infuse the company with hundreds of thousands of their
personal funds to keep the business afloat.

(R. 273, ^ 25; 627; 642; 643.)

They

mortgaged their house to obtain operating funds for the business. (R. 627; 642.) Due to
delinquencies, Stone Flood suffered a diminished business reputation, and the Stones
were required to personally guarantee Stone Flood's business deals with suppliers and
others with whom Stone Flood had dealt. (R. 278-279; 627; 641; 642.) The Stones were
left with hundreds of thousands of dollars of personal debt, which they would not have
incurred if Safeco had not misrepresented its intent to honor its obligations under the
policy. (R. 643.) These are all individual harms resulting from Safeco's bad faith, which
are separate and distinct from the harm to Stone Flood.
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Moreover, Safeco had actual knowledge of the unique interrelationship between
the Stones individually and Stone Flood, which establishes that Safeco owed independent
tort duties to the Stones individually. At the time of the fire, Safeco was aware that Stone
Flood & Fire was a closely held corporation, that it only had two shareholders, and that it
was dealing with the two sole shareholders of the company as to the processing of the
insurance claim. Safeco was further aware of the impact any harm to the company would
pose to the Stones individually, as the Stones repeatedly told Safeco as much. (R. 627268; 642-643.) Finally, Safeco, by its own conduct, knew that it was treating the Stones
differently than shareholders in a large, publicly traded corporation because, for example,
it was requiring the Stones to personally and individually sign the non-waiver agreement
(R. 664), something it never would have required of shareholders of a non-closely held
corporation.
Safeco cites cases holding that "shareholders may not prosecute emotional distress
claims for conduct directed at the corporation." (Appellee's Brief at 43.) But that is
precisely the point. The Stones are not claiming that Safeco's conduct was directed only
at Stone Flood. Rather, the Stones have shown evidence that Safeco's conduct was
directed at them individually, in addition to the corporation.
Safeco declares that, under the Stones' interpretation, "every shareholder could
file intentional infliction claims for harms to the corporation." (Appellee's Brief at 45.)
Of course, the Stones are not suing for harms to the corporation, but for harms to
themselves. Moreover, under the Stones' argument, the Court need not define every
instance in which the shareholder of a closely held corporation might or might not assert
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claims. The Court need conclude only that under these facts - an insurer who issued a
policy to a corporation known to be closely held, who knew there were only two
shareholders at the time of its alleged breach of duty to them, who interacted directly with
those shareholders, who induced the two shareholders to take actions to their personal
detriment, who was aware of the impact of its actions on the shareholders, and who
required the individual shareholders to sign a non-waiver agreement - a cause of action is
permitted.
C

The Stones preserved their argument that, because Safeco forced
them to sign personal guarantees, they have standing to assert
IIED claims against Safeco.

In its final argument, Safeco contends that the Stones did not argue in the Court
below that the personal guaranty gave rise to standing to pursue tort claims against
Safeco. However, the Stones presented evidence to the district court that they signed the
non-waiver agreement, and noted that fact in conjunction with its IIED arguments. (R.
273, ^[24; 329.)
Secondly, the non-waiver agreement is in fact tantamount to a personal guaranty,
and is not a "red herring" issue as Safeco suggests. (Appellee's Brief at 46.) The fact
that Safeco knew it was mandating the Stones to personally guaranty the repayment of
benefits under the policy created or evidenced the independent tort duty to the Stones.
Safeco later breached that duty when it failed to make timely payments under the policy
to Stone Flood, which Safeco knew would harm the Stones as individuals.
Safeco knew at the time that, because of its alleged breaches, the Stones were
being required to personally guarantee debts of the closely held corporation. In each of
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the cases cited by Safeco for the proposition that courts reject claims of shareholders who
guarantee a corporation's debt, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not shown
evidence of individual harm arising from something other than the harm as a shareholder
and harm resulting from liability for debts pursuant to the guaranty. In this case, the
Stones have put forth evidence that Safeco knew of their unique personal reliance upon
Stone Flood for their individual financial survival, a far different factual scenario.
D.

James and Patrice also have standing because of statutorily
imposed personal liability.

Although Safeco contends that shareholder distributions would not be subject to
personal liability, Safeco does not dispute that the Stones could be deprived of corporate
assets that they lawfully obtained during dissolution of Stone Flood pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 16-10a-1408(2). Appellants adduced evidence before the trial court that
Safeco's failure to pay benefits within a reasonable period of time forced Stone Flood
into dissolution. At the least, there is a dispute of fact over whether the Stones are
subject to deprivation of the corporate assets that they otherwise would have been entitled
to retain in the absence of Safeco's bad faith.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse
the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for trial.

25

DATED this 30th day of March, 2011.
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.

£
L. Ricn Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
Sarah E. Spencer
Attorneys for Appellants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 30th day of March, 2011, two true and correct copies
of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS were hand-delivered to:
Matthew L. Lalli
Troy L. Booher
SNELL & WILMER
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellee
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C,

L. Ri(5h Humpherys
Karra J. Porter
Sarah E. Spencer
Attorneys for Appellants

?£

